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Individuals with mirror-touch synaesthesia (MTS) experience touch on their own bodies when
observing another person being touched. Whilst somatosensory processing in MTS has been extensively
investigated, the extent to which the remapping of observed touch on the synaesthete’s body can also
lead to changes in the mental representation of the self remains unknown. We adapted the
experimental paradigm of the ‘enfacement illusion’ to quantify the changes in self-face recognition
as a result of synaesthetic touch. MTS and control participants observed the face of an unfamiliar
person being touched or not, without delivering touch on the participant’s face. Changes in self-
representation were quantiﬁed with a self-face recognition task, using ‘morphed’ images containing
varying proportions of the participant’s face and the face of the unfamiliar other. This task was
administered before and after the exposure to the other face. While self-recognition performance for
both groups was similar during pre-test, MTS individuals showed a signiﬁcant change in self-
recognition performance following the observation of touch delivered to the other face. Speciﬁcally,
the images that participants had initially perceived as containing equal quantities of self and other
became more likely to be recognised as the self after viewing the other being touched. These results
suggest that observing touch on others not only elicits a conscious experience of touch in MTS, but also
elicits a change in the mental representation of the self, blurring self-other boundaries. This is
consistent with a multisensory account of the self, whereby integrated multisensory experiences
maintain or update self-representations.
& 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Mirroring properties in neurons in the primate brain have
been well documented since the discovery of the mirror neurons
in macaque monkeys (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996).
There is now strong evidence supporting the presence of a similar
mirror neuron system (MNS) in humans, which is thought to
provide a neural basis for the interpersonal sharing of motor
representations (e.g., Buccino et al., 2001; Mukamel, Ekstrom,
Kaplan, Iacoboni, & Fried, 2010). Furthermore, evidence has
suggested that the MNS is not restricted to the motor cortex in
humans, but that we also possess a ‘somatosensory mirror
system’ that is activated both when we perceive touch to others,
and when we experience touch to the self (e.g., Blakemore,
Bristow, Bird, Frith, & Ward, 2005; Ebisch et al., 2008; Keysers
et al., 2004; Keysers, Kaas, & Gazzola, 2010; Rossetti, Miniussi,
Maravita, & Bolognini, 2012). This vicarious activation of thell rights reserved.
.020
x: þ44 1784434347.somatosensory cortex may form a neural basis for the under-
standing of others’ sensory experiences, and may play an impor-
tant role in empathy (e.g., Schaefer, Heinze, & Rotte, 2012).
Interestingly, this vicarious somatosensory activity to observed
touch has measurable behavioural effects. Perception of touch to
our own bodies, when delivered near the perceptual threshold,
can be modulated by the observation of touch to others (e.g.,
Cardini et al., 2011; Serino, Giovagnoli, & Ladavas, 2009; Serino,
Pizzoferrato, & Ladavas, 2008). For example, viewing someone
being touched on the cheek can enhance detection of a tactile
stimulus being applied to our own cheek in a congruent location,
an effect known as visual remapping of touch (VRT: Serino et al.,
2008). The effect of observed touch on tactile perception has been
shown to be extinguished when somatosensory activity is dis-
rupted using TMS (Fiorio & Haggard, 2005), which suggests that
this effect is reliant on vicarious activation of the ‘somatosensory
mirror system’.
Although the observation of touch can enhance perception of
tactile stimulation delivered to the body, it very rarely elicits a
conscious experience of touch in the absence of actual tactile
stimulation. However, a type of synaesthesia has been identiﬁed
which provides an interesting exception to this case. For individuals
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touched consistently produces a marked conscious experience of
touch on their own body. This experience is thought to occur in
approximately 1.6% of people (Banissy, Cohen Kadosh, Maus, Walsh,
& Ward, 2009) and to be a consequence of increased cortical
activity within the somatosensory mirror system (Blakemore
et al., 2005). Consistent with the purported role of this system in
social cognition, MTS individuals show enhanced emotion recogni-
tion (Banissy et al., 2011a; Banissy, Walsh, & Muggleton, 2011b)
and score more highly on empathy measures (Banissy & Ward,
2007) than non-synaesthetes. Although not yet explicitly tested, it
has been suggested that the increased activity within the somato-
sensory mirror system in MTS is mediated by mechanisms involved
in self-other discrimination. Moreover, several authors have sug-
gested that MTS may be linked to a blurring of self-other bound-
aries when perceiving touch to another person (Banissy et al., 2009;
Banissy, Walsh, & Muggleton, 2011; Aimola-Davis & White, 2012),
leading to a disinhibition of normal somatosensory mirror mechan-
isms (Fitzgibbon et al., 2012).
Intriguingly, in non-synaesthetes, we can experimentally
induce a blurring of self-other boundaries by employing synchro-
nous visuotactile stimulation (Tsakiris, 2010). This type of stimu-
lation can evoke bodily illusions, induce misattributions of
viewed tactile sensations to the self, and eventually change the
perceptual boundaries between self and other. For example, in the
rubber hand illusion (RHI), tactile stimulation delivered in
synchrony to the participant’s own unseen hand and a visible
fake rubber hand can induce illusory ownership over the rubber
hand, and induces the participant to attribute the tactile sensa-
tions on their own hand to the touch they can see on the rubber
hand (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998).
In a facial analogue of the RHI, touch is delivered to a
participant’s face whilst they view a video in which another
person is being touched on a specularly-congruent location in
synchrony with the participant’s felt touch (Sforza, Bufalari,
Haggard, & Aglioti, 2010; Tsakiris, 2008). This procedure, known
as the ‘enfacement illusion’, elicits a situation akin to looking at
oneself in a mirror, yet seeing an unfamiliar person’s face in place
of your own reﬂection. During enfacement, participants report a
change in the experience of the source of sensation from their
own face to the other’s, and a subjective increase in perceived
similarity between the other and themselves (Tajadura-Jimenez,
Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012).
This subjective increase in self-other similarity is accompanied by
a measurable behavioural change in the way participants represent
their own facial appearance (the ‘self-face representation’). Tajadura-
Jimenez et al. (2012) presented participants with morphed faces
containing varying percentages of their own face, and they decided
whether each face looked more like themselves, or an unfamiliar
other. After experiencing the enfacement illusion with the other’s
face, the images that participants had initially perceived as contain-
ing equal quantities of self and other became more likely to be
recognised as the self. The direction of this change was elucidated by
Tajadura-Jimenez et al. (2012) in an additional experiment, in which
they demonstrated that the enfacement illusion independently
affected recognition of the self-face, while recognition of the other’s
face remained unchanged. Speciﬁcally, they showed that when
participants watched a video of another’s face gradually morphing
into their own face after a period of enfacement, they accepted faces
with a higher percentage of ‘other’ as ‘self’. Importantly, however,
this change did not occur when they watched a video showing the
other direction of morphing, from self to other. This suggests that the
synchronous shared touch of the enfacement illusion induced
participants to incorporate features of the other’s face into their
own face representation, resulting in the participants representing
the other’s face as more similar to their own.This supports a multisensory account of the self, whereby our
stored representations of our physical appearance (our ‘body
representations’) are not solely derived from stable representa-
tions, but instead is maintained and updated by integrated
multisensory experiences (Tsakiris, 2008). We may recognize
and form a mental representation of our own face because our
mirror reﬂection moves when we move, and we see it being
touched when we feel touch ourselves. In both the RHI and
enfacement illusion, an individual experiences a touch that they
see on another body, resulting in measurable changes in their
body representations. This sharing of another’s tactile experience
bears similarities to MTS. This raises the intriguing possibility that
when MTS individuals view touch on others, it not only elicits a
shared tactile experience, but actually alters their body represen-
tation, in the same way that bodily illusions such as enfacement
and RHI induce change in non-synaesthetes.
We aimed to investigate changes in body representation in
MTS, by inducing the enfacement illusion in MTS individuals
without delivering physical touch to their faces, and measuring
the effect of pure tactile observation on their stored self-face
representation. Aimola-Davies and White (2012) recently demon-
strated that RHI can be induced in MTS participants without
delivering physical touch to their own hand, by allowing them
merely to observe touch on the rubber hand. The synaesthetic
touch that they experienced induced a subjective incorporation of
the rubber hand into their body representation. However, it
remains to be answered whether synaesthetic touch can change
stored mental representations of a key feature of one’s self-
identity, such as one’s own face.
This study consisted of two experiments. In the ﬁrst experi-
ment, a group of MTS participants and a group of non-
synaesthetic controls viewed another’s face being touched, but
were not physically touched themselves. For MTS individuals, we
hypothesised that the synaesthetic experience of seeing touch on
another’s face could change their self-face representation, in the
same way that physical experience of touch seen on another’s face
changes the self-face representations of non-synaesthetic indivi-
duals. To test this, we measured self face-recognition before and
after the enfacement session to investigate whether there were
any changes in self-face representation induced by the observa-
tion of touch. We also measured the participants’ subjective
experiences of ownership, self-other similarity, and self-
attribution of touch. A control condition was employed, in which
the face that the participants viewed was untouched. This con-
trolled for effects of mere exposure to the other’s face, and thus
ensured that any effect we did ﬁnd was speciﬁc to experienced
touch, rather than mere visual exposure to the face of another
individual. In a second control experiment, we investigated the
similarity of this effect to the standard enfacement illusion in
participants without synaesthesia. Another non-MTS control
group observed touch on another’s face whilst physical touch
was delivered on their own face, following the standard proce-
dure of the enfacement illusion. Subsequent changes in self-face
recognition were compared to those elicited by the mere obser-
vation of touch in MTS individuals.2. Material and methods
2.1. Participants
Potential MTS participants were ﬁrst selected through self-report via a web-
based questionnaire investigating different types of synaesthesia. Those (n¼25)
who answered ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ to the statement ‘I sometimes feel touch
when I see other people being touched’ on a 5-point Likert scale were subse-
quently contacted to complete a further web screening devised by Holle, Banissy,
Wright, Bowling, and Ward (2011). Participants saw a series of videos of people
Fig. 1. The design of Experiment 1. Each participant completed two experimental blocks, comprising TOUCH and NO-TOUCH conditions. A self-recognition task, performed
both before and after viewing a video, required participants to decide whether morphed images looked more like their own face, or that of another.
L. Maister et al. / Neuropsychologia 51 (2013) 802–808804and objects being either touched or approached by a ﬁnger. Participants
were asked to report on their experiences of touch, if any, for each video.
Six participants (all female1, MAGE¼19.0 years) who gave reports of experienced
touch in two or more of the videos in which people were touched, reﬂecting
4.3% of the total questionnaire respondents, were selected to participate in
Experiment 1.
Twenty non-MTS participants (all female) were also recruited for the study.
Non-MTS status was conﬁrmed by self-report on the web-based questionnaire, to
which all participants answered ‘‘strongly disagree’’ to the statement ‘I sometimes
feel touch when I see other people being touched’. Ten of these non-MTS
participants (MAGE¼19.9 years), referred to as the Control-1 group, participated
in Experiment 1 and performed exactly the same task as the MTS individuals. The
remaining ten non-MTS participants (MAGE¼20.7 years), referred to as the
Control-2 group, participated in Experiment 2 which followed the standard
enfacement procedure, allowing us to compare the effect of touch observation
in MTS with the effect of standard enfacement in non-MTS participants.
2.2. Procedure
The procedure employed to generate the experimental stimuli was identical for
both Experiments 1 and 2. Two female individuals were selected to model as the face
of the ‘other’. A photo and two videos were recorded with each model looking straight
into the camera with a neutral expression. For the ‘TOUCH’ video, their right cheek was
stroked with a cotton bud every three seconds, whereas for the ‘NO-TOUCH’ video, no
tactile stimulation was delivered. Before the experiment began, we took a photo of
each participant’s face, which we subsequently mirror-reversed to most closely match
their stored facial representation. From this photo, morphed face stimuli were
generated bymorphing the participant’s face with the twomodels’ faces. This produced
two sets of 100 images for each participant, which contained increasing amounts of the
participant’s face ranging from 0% (100% model) to 100% (0% model). These images
were used as stimuli in both experiments.
2.2.1. Procedure for experiment 1
The MTS group and the Control-1 group participated in Experiment 1. The
experiment comprised two experimental blocks; one for the TOUCH condition and
one for the NO-TOUCH condition (see Fig. 1). Each block began with a self-
recognition task, in which each trial displayed a morphed image, and the
participant had to decide whether the image looked more like the self, or the
other. The ﬁrst set of trials were presented in an interleaved double-staircase
procedure, following that of Tajadura-Jimenez et al. (2012), in order to ascertain
the participant’s ‘point of subjective equality’; the image at which they responded
‘self’ and ‘other’ at chance levels. This was taken as the baseline image. For the
ﬁnal 60 trials of the self-recognition task, the participant was presented with1 The fact that all MTS participants were female may be partly due to the high
proportion of females initially responding to the web-based questionnaire (76%).
Because of this gender bias in selection, we make no empirical claims about the
gender ratio of mirror-touch synaesthetes in the general population. Only females
were chosen for subsequent control groups in order to match the MTS group for
gender.images containing subjectively more other than self (‘other’ trials: 8% less self than
baseline, and 4% less self than baseline), the baseline image, and images contain-
ing subjectively more self than other (‘self’ trials: 4% more self than baseline, and
8% more self than baseline). The choice of these images was based on the results of
previous studies investigating the effect of enfacement on self-recognition. The
enfacement effect has been shown to only occur when self-other discrimination is
difﬁcult, and thus only to images close to Baseline (the PSE). Previous studies have
shown a change in self-recognition around the Baseline of between 3% and 6%
(e.g., Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 2012; Tsakiris, 2008). Thus, we
tested self-recognition at Baseline, as well as to images with up to 8% more Other
(Other images), and up to 8% more Self (Self images) in order to ensure that we
had a high change of detecting any likely changes to self recognition in the MTS
group. There were 20 ‘other’ trials, 20 baseline trials, and 20 ‘self’ trials presented
in total, and order of trials was randomised.
The participant was then shown a 2-min video of the model (either the TOUCH
or NO-TOUCH video), during which the participant was instructed to keep as still
as possible whilst viewing the video, and to keep their eyes on the model’s face at
all times. The participant then completed another self-recognition task, with the
same range of 8%, 4%, baseline, þ4% and þ8% images as in the pre-video
stage. Finally, the participant reported their subjective experiences by completing
an illusion questionnaire, in which they were presented with a set of statements
(nine for the TOUCH condition, eight for the NO-TOUCH condition, adapted from
Tajadura-Jimenez et al. (2012)) on a computer screen in a random order, and rated
their agreement with each one using a 7-point Likert scale.
Each participant completed one TOUCH block and one NO-TOUCH block. The
model featuring as the ‘other’ face was consistent within, but differed between,
experimental blocks. A different model was used for each block to avoid the
experience with a model in one condition ‘carrying over’ to affect subsequent self-
recognition responses in the following condition. The order of conditions and the
model assigned to each condition was counterbalanced between participants.
2.2.2. Procedure for experiment 2
The Control-2 group participated in Experiment 2, which contained two
experimental conditions. For the ENFACEMENT condition, they performed self-
recognition before and after observing a TOUCH video, during which they received
concurrent touch to their left cheek in synchrony with the touch they observed on
the model’s cheek, as per the standard enfacement illusion procedure. For the NO-
TOUCH condition, they performed self-recognition before and after the NO-TOUCH
video, in which they merely viewed the model in the absence of touch delivered to
either the participant’s or the model’s face. The procedure for this condition was
identical to that of the NO-TOUCH condition in Experiment 1. All other aspects of
the task and procedure (e.g., videos, face-recognition task, illusion questionnaire)
were identical to Experiment 1.3. Results
First, we analysed the data from Experiment 1 to investigate
the effects of touch observation on self-face recognition in MTS
and non-MTS individuals. We then analysed the data from
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results from Experiment 1, to allow us to assess the similarities
between the effect of touch observation in the MTS group to the
effect of the enfacement illusion in the non-MTS (Control-2) group.
3.1. Results of experiment 1
For each participant, the proportion of ‘self’ responses given to
each type of image was calculated for both the pre- and post-
video self-recognition tasks. The 8% and 4% images (contain-
ing a lower percentage of self than the baseline image) were
categorized as the ‘other’ images, and the þ4% and þ8% images
(containing a higher percentage of self than baseline) were
categorized as the ‘self’ images.
Given the small sample sizes, our data were most suited to
non-parametric analysis. However, due to the limited applicabil-
ity of non-parametric methods to mixed factorial designs, we ﬁrst
performed an initial ANOVA in order to identify any interactions
between factors, before proceeding to investigate and verify these
interactions using non-parametric analyses. To begin, the propor-
tion of ‘self’ responses were entered into a 2(time: pre vs.
post-video)3(image: Other vs. Baseline vs. Self)2(condition:
TOUCH vs. NO-TOUCH)2(group: MTS vs. Control-1) repeated
measures ANOVA. Residuals were subjected to Shapiro–Wilk tests
for normality and none deviated signiﬁcantly from a normal
distribution, all p-values 4 .05. Although Mauchly’s test of
sphericity was not violated, W¼0.876, p¼ .422, we proceeded to
use Greenhouse–Geisser corrections to ensure the most conser-
vative tests for our small samples. There was no signiﬁcant main
effect of group on proportion of self-responses, F(1,14)¼0.75,
p¼ .400. There was however an expected main effect of image,
F(1.23,14.00)¼53.96, po .001, with Self images eliciting the high-
est proportion of self-responses, M¼ .72, followed by Baseline
images, M¼ .54, followed by Other images, M¼ .33. Importantly,
this main effect was modulated by a four-way interaction
between time, image, condition and group, F(1.78,24.91)¼3.74,
p¼ .042. No other main effects or interactions were signiﬁcant.
To investigate the four-way interaction, we ﬁrst ensured that
there were no signiﬁcant differences between the two groups on
pre-video self-recognition performance. Pre-video scores were
entered into a mixed repeated-measures ANOVA with image
(Other vs. Baseline vs. Self), condition (TOUCH vs. NO-TOUCH)Fig. 2. Left panel: Change in proportion of ‘self’ responses given by MTS and non-MTS
images. Starred contrast indicates signiﬁcance at two-tailed level. Positive change in ‘se
the video. Right panel: Change in proportion of ‘self’ responses given by non-MTS gro
delivered to the face during observation of TOUCH video (Experiment 2). Again, starreand group (MTS vs. Control-1) as factors, which revealed an
expected main effect of image, F(1.47,20.60)¼49.08, po .001,
but no main effect of group, F(1,14)¼0.68, p¼ .425, nor any
interactions (p4 .05). We then calculated change scores by sub-
tracting pre- from post-video self-responses, and investigated the
effect of condition and image type on self-recognition change for
each group separately.
In the Control-1 group, a 3(image: Other vs. Baseline vs.
Self)2(condition: TOUCH vs. NO-TOUCH) ANOVA did not reveal
any signiﬁcant main effect of condition, F(1,9)¼0.66, p¼ .803, nor
a Condition Image interaction, F(1.98,17.77)¼0.57, p¼ .571. In
the MTS group, however, the ANOVA yielded an interaction
between image and condition on change in self-responses,
F(1.24,6.21)¼16.56, p¼ .010. Visual inspection of the means
suggested that only self-recognition change to the baseline image
had been affected by condition (see Fig. 2). This was conﬁrmed
using non-parametric pairwise comparisons. Wilcoxon signed
rank tests were used to compare self-recognition change scores
between TOUCH and NO-TOUCH conditions for Self, Baseline and
Other image types individually. For the MTS group, change scores
to Baseline images were signiﬁcantly higher in the TOUCH
condition, M¼ .267 (SD¼ .260) than the NO-TOUCH condition,
M¼ .067 (SD¼ .178), z¼2.06, p¼ .039. A one-sample Wilcoxon
Signed Rank test on change scores for NO-TOUCH showed no
signiﬁcant difference from zero, p¼ .496, suggesting that the NO-
TOUCH condition did not yield any signiﬁcant changes in self-
recognition. There were no signiﬁcant differences between con-
ditions for Self images, z¼0.11, p¼ .916, or for Other images,
z¼1.47, p¼ .141. For the Control-1 group, there were no
signiﬁcant differences between conditions for any of the three
image types, all p4 .05, thus conﬁrming the general pattern of
interaction illustrated in the initial ANOVA.
Responses to the illusion questionnaire were then analysed.
Independent t-tests were employed to compare mean responses
across all questions between groups, for each condition. For the
TOUCH condition, the MTS group gave a signiﬁcantly higher mean
rating to the illusion questionnaire (across all questions) than did
the Control-1 group, t(13.93)¼3.57, p¼ .003. For the NO-TOUCH
condition, the ratings given by the two groups did not signiﬁcantly
differ, t(14)¼1.01, p¼ .332. Group differences in median responses
for each individual question were analysed using Mann–Whitney U
tests, the results of which can be found in Table 1.groups after viewing TOUCH and NO-TOUCH videos, for Self, Baseline, and Other
lf’ responses signiﬁes an increase in the proportion of ‘self’ responses after viewing
up after experiencing ENFACEMENT, in which synchronous tactile stimulation is
d contrast indicates signiﬁcance at two-tailed level. Error bars indicate S.E.M.
Table 1
Table showing median Likert responses given by MTS and non-MTS (Control-1) groups to each illusion question ranging from 3 (strongly disagree) to þ3 (strongly
agree), for TOUCH and NO-TOUCH conditions. P-values for individual questions indicate the results of Mann–Whitney U tests comparing the responses to each
questionnaire item between MTS and non-MTS groups. P-values for ‘total mean response’ indicate the results of independent t-tests comparing the mean response across
all items of the questionnaire between groups. Asterisks indicate signiﬁcance at a¼ .05.
Illusion question TOUCH M(SD) NO-TOUCH M(SD)
MTS NON-MTS p-value MTS NON-MTS p-value
‘‘I felt like the other’s face was my face’’ 1.00 (1.37) 2.50 (1.37) .008n 0.50 (1.47) 2.00 (1.95) .122
‘‘It seemed like the other’s face belonged to me’’ 0.00 (2.17) 2.00 (0.67) .126 1.50 (1.83) 2.00 (1.94) .781
‘‘It seemed like I was looking at my own mirror reﬂection’’ 0.50 (1.54) 2.00 (1.94) .263 0.50 (2.07) 2.00 (1.51) .342
‘‘It seemed like the other’s face began to resemble my own face’’ 0.50 (2.06) 1.50 (1.51) .098 0.00 (1.47) 0.00 (2.12) .657
‘‘It seemed like my own face began to resemble the other person’s face’’ 1.00 (1.03) 2.50 (1.64) .005n 0.50 (1.94) 1.00 (2.01) .473
‘‘It seemed like my own face was out of my control’’ 0.50 (1.63) 2.00 (1.84) .200 0.00 (1.63) 2.00 (1.34) .095
‘‘It seemed like the experience of my face was less vivid than normal’’ 1.50 (1.26) 0.00 (2.32) .203 0.50 (1.47) 0.00 (1.96) .378
‘‘I felt that I was imitating the other person’’ 1.00 (1.03) 0.50 (1.94) .305 1.00 (1.52) 1.00 (1.99) .197
‘‘I felt a touch on my face when I saw the cotton bud touching the other’s face’’ 1.00 (1.83) 2.50 (1.33) .032n – – –
Total mean response 0.30 (0.70) 1.49 (1.30) .003n 0.10 (1.07) 0.86 (1.50) .332
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The results from the Control-2 group in Experiment 2 allowed
us to investigate the similarity of the reported effect in MTS to the
standard enfacement illusion in non-MTS participants. First, we
conﬁrmed and replicated the standard enfacement effect on self-
recognition (see Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 2012;
Tsakiris, 2008). Change scores for Control-2 were calculated by
subtracting pre- from post-video self-responses, as in the pre-
vious analysis of MTS results. The change scores to Baseline
images were compared within-subjects between ENFACEMENT
and NO-TOUCH conditions with a Wilcoxon signed rank test. As
predicted, there was a signiﬁcant difference in the proportion of
self-responses in the ENFACEMENT condition and the NO-TOUCH
condition, z¼1.94, p¼ .052, with the ENFACEMENT condi-
tion yielding a signiﬁcantly larger increase in self-recognition
than the NO-TOUCH condition, MENFACEMENT¼ .235 (SD¼ .277),
MNO-TOUCH¼ .050 (SD¼ .247).
We were then interested in comparing our enfacement effect
with the effect of viewing touch, both for individuals with MTS
and for non-synaesthetes. For our three groups of participants
(MTS, Control-1, Control-2), we calculated difference scores by
subtracting change scores in the experimental condition (for MTS
and Control-1, this was the TOUCH condition, and for Control-2,
this was the ENFACEMENT condition) from change scores in the
NO-TOUCH condition (which did not signiﬁcantly differ between
groups, Kruskal–Wallis test p¼ .208). These difference scores
reﬂected the differential effect of our experimental manipulation
(viewing touch for MTS and Control-1, or Enfacement for Control-
2) relative to that of merely viewing an untouched face. The
calculation of these scores allowed us to compare the differential
effects of our experimental conditions on self-recognition
between groups, using non-parametric methods, without losing
vital information regarding the relative changes between experi-
mental and control conditions.
We ﬁrst compared difference scores between TOUCH in non-
MTS participants (Control-1) and ENFACEMENT in non-MTS
participants (Control-2). This revealed a signiﬁcant difference,
U¼19.5, p¼ .021, whereby for non-MTS participants, ENFACE-
MENT yielded a signiﬁcantly larger difference score, Mdn¼0.25,
than did TOUCH, Mdn,  .05. This suggests that, as expected,
ENFACEMENT had a signiﬁcantly larger effect than TOUCH for
non-MTS participants on self-recognition change, relative to the
NO-TOUCH control condition. We then compared the differentialeffects of TOUCH for MTS participants to the differential effects of
ENFACEMENT for Control-2 participants, using a Mann–Whitney
U test on difference scores. This revealed no signiﬁcant difference,
U¼28.0, p¼ .827, which suggests that the behavioural effect of
TOUCH on self-recognition change for the MTS group was
equivalent to that of ENFACEMENT for non-MTS individuals,
relative to the NO-TOUCH control condition.
Finally, the non-MTS group’s responses to the illusion ques-
tionnaire after the ENFACEMENT condition were compared to the
MTS group’s responses after the TOUCH condition, to investigate
whether their subjective experiences during the videos were also
equivalent. A Mann–Whitney U test revealed no signiﬁcant
difference in average strength of illusory experience (comprising
the mean response to all nine illusion questions) between the
groups, U¼25.0, z¼0.543, p¼ .587, suggesting that the TOUCH
condition for MTS individuals elicited an illusory experience of a
similar strength to that elicited by the ENFACEMENT condition in
non-synaesthetes. We then compared scores given on individual
items between groups; there were no signiﬁcant group differ-
ences on any questionnaire item, p4 .05.4. Discussion
We investigated the malleability of self-other boundaries with
a self-face recognition task in a group of individuals with mirror-
touch synaesthesia (MTS). While somatosensory processing in
MTS has been extensively investigated, the extent to which
synaesthetic touch can also lead to changes in self-other bound-
aries remains unknown. To investigate this, MTS and control
individuals took part in an adapted version of the ‘enfacement
illusion’ paradigm, in which they observed the face of an unfa-
miliar person being touched or not, without being touched
themselves. To quantify the changes in self-other boundaries as
a result of synaesthetic experience, we administered a self-face
recognition task before and after the exposure to the other face.
While self-recognition performance for both groups was similar
during pre-test, the MTS participants showed a speciﬁc and
signiﬁcant change in self-recognition performance following the
observation of touch delivered to the other face. During the
standard enfacement illusion paradigm, tactile stimulation is
delivered to participants’ faces whilst they observe another
person’s face being touched in synchrony. This experience of
synchronous ‘shared touch’ elicits a measurable change in
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incorporate elements of the other’s face (Tajadura-Jimenez et al.,
2012). The results of the present study suggest that, in a way that
is analogous to the classic enfacement illusion, for MTS the
observation of touch on others not only elicits a conscious
experience of touch, but also a change in the mental representa-
tion of the self-face, analogous to the change induced in non-
synaesthetes when exposed to the enfacement illusion.
In the MTS group, but not the non-MTS group, self-face
recognition was signiﬁcantly altered after viewing touch on
another’s face. Speciﬁcally, the images that MTS participants
had initially perceived as containing equal quantities of self and
other became more likely to be recognised as the self after
viewing the other being touched. A ‘no-touch’ control condition
did not yield any changes in self-recognition, demonstrating that
the effect was speciﬁc to the experience of touch rather than any
general effect of visual familiarity. Our results suggested that the
MTS participants’ mental representations of their facial appear-
ance had been updated to incorporate features of the other’s face,
enhancing perceived self-other similarity. This behavioural effect
was accompanied by subjective reports of increased self-other
resemblance, ownership and illusory touch whilst watching the
other being touched.
In a second experiment, we compared the effect of touch
observation in MTS individuals to the effect of the standard
enfacement illusion in non-synaesthetes. We demonstrated that
the effect of viewing touch on self-recognition in MTS was
equivalent to the change in self-recognition elicited by enface-
ment in a group of non-MTS participants. Furthermore, analysis of
questionnaire responses showed that the observation of touch
elicited a phenomenology in MTS participants that was of
equivalent intensity and subjective quality to the phenomenolo-
gical experience elicited by the enfacement illusion in non-
synaesthetes.
Imaging studies have identiﬁed a network of brain areas
involved in representing and distinguishing self from other,
comprising the inferior parietal lobule and inferior frontal gyrus,
the temporoparietal junction, and the right insula (see Northoff,
Qin, & Feinberg, 2011, for review). Banissy et al. (2009) highlight
this network as likely to be atypical in MTS, leading to a
remapping of observed sensations onto the self. In particular,
the right insular lobe has been shown to be involved in key
domains of self-processing, such as body-ownership (Tsakiris,
Hesse, Boy, Haggard, & Fink, 2007), empathy (Singer et al.,
2004) and self-face recognition (Devue et al., 2007; Morita et al.,
2008). Intriguingly, Blakemore et al. (2005) found that the ante-
rior insula was the only area to be activated solely in an individual
with MTS, and not in control participants, during the observation
of touch. The anterior insula is anatomically connected to the
secondary somatosensory cortex (Mesulam & Mufson, 1985),
which might act as a neural pathway whereby self-related
processing and tactile awareness interact. Further work is needed
to elucidate the causal connections between these areas, both in
MTS and non-MTS individuals.
The self-face recognition task employed in the current study
does not give information about the directionality of the change
in face recognition. However, we believe it likely that our effect
observed in the MTS group reﬂects a speciﬁc change in the
representation of the self-face, rather than the other-face, for
two reasons. First, the results of a video-morphing task used by
Tajadura-Jimenez et al. (2012) found that enfacement in non-
synaesthetic participants elicited a signiﬁcant change in self-face
recognition, whilst leaving other-face recognition unchanged.
Given that our study has revealed notable behavioural and
phenomenological similarities between the enfacement illusion
in non-MTS individuals, and the observation of touch in MTSindividuals, it is likely that the direction of the effect in the MTS
group is the same as that reported by Tajadura-Jimenez et al.
(2012) second, this prediction is also consistent with the overall
phenomenology of MTS, as a type of synaesthesia characterised
by an interjection of the other into the self, rather than a
projection of the self into others. For example, MTS individuals
incorporate the touch of others onto their own bodies, but do not
project their own touch experience onto other’s bodies. To be
consistent with this general phenomenology of MTS, we would
expect the features of others to be incorporated into the self-face
representation, rather than the features of one’s own face being
projected onto the other’s face. Concordantly, the MTS group in
the current study gave signiﬁcantly higher agreement ratings to
the statement ‘‘It seemed like my own face began to resemble the
other person’s face’’ during the TOUCH video than they did to the
statement ‘‘It seemed like the other’s face began to resemble my
own face’’, relative to the non-MTS control group, which again
suggests that the effect seen in this group reﬂects a speciﬁc,
directional change in the representation of the self-face, rather
than the other-face.
It is possible that the effect of viewing touch on self-face
representation in MTS individuals may not be due to the experi-
ence of illusory touch on their own face, but a more general effect
of increased attention or tactile imagery. However, previous work
has shown that attentional factors are unlikely to explain MTS, as
individuals with MTS experience touch when they see touch on
faces, but not when they see touch on objects (Holle et al., 2011)
nor when a light ﬂash merely cues attention to a speciﬁc area of
an observed face (Banissy et al., 2009). In addition, it has been
shown that imagery alone is not enough to induce MTS in such
individuals, as they experience touch only when they see touch
on another face, but not when they see a hand merely approach-
ing the face (Holle et al., 2011). Our MTS participants were
recruited following a screening protocol which involved videos
of hands delivering touch to, or merely approaching, a variety of
stimuli (objects, dummy body-parts, and humans). Our MTS
participants reported synesthetic touch solely during observation
of touch to humans, and not during observation of touch to
objects or dummies. Furthermore, in line with previously veriﬁed
individuals with MTS, they did not experience synesthetic touch
when viewing hands merely approaching faces. Therefore, it is
unlikely that changes in self-face representation in the MTS group
were due merely to higher tactile imagery abilities, or increased
attention to tactile events.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that the observation of
touch can induce a measurable change in the stored self-face
representations of MTS individuals. After viewing another’s face
being touched, MTS participants incorporated features of the
other’s face into their own face representation. This lends further
support to the multisensory account of the self, which argues that
our representations of our own body, including the representation
of our face, are continually updated by integrated multisensory
experiences. Importantly, this study has shown that, for MTS
individuals, the presence of physical touch is not necessary to
update body representations. In this case, the integrated experi-
ence of observed touch and synaesthetic touch is sufﬁcient to
cause a signiﬁcant change in self-face representation and self-
other boundaries. This effect was shown to be quantitatively and
qualitatively similar to the change in self-recognition seen after
the enfacement illusion in non-synaesthetes. Whilst other studies
have investigated the remapping of observed touch to the self in
MTS, ours is the ﬁrst to demonstrate that this remapping of touch
signiﬁcantly changes the way synaesthetes represent their own
bodies. Given the documented engagement of the insula and
secondary somatosensory cortex in MTS (Blakemore et al., 2005)
as well as in body-awareness in non-MTS individuals (Tsakiris
L. Maister et al. / Neuropsychologia 51 (2013) 802–808808et al., 2007), the behavioural results of the present study advance
our understanding of the multisensory basis of the self and
its involvement in key social cognition processes such as the
self-other distinction.Acknowledgements
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